Non-Rational Persons and the Original Position: A Rawlsian Defense of Animal Citizenship by Corazza, Michael
Honors Theses at the University of Iowa 
Spring 2018 
Non-Rational Persons and the Original Position: A Rawlsian 
Defense of Animal Citizenship 
Michael Corazza 
University of Iowa 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.uiowa.edu/honors_theses 
 Part of the Applied Ethics Commons, and the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons 
This honors thesis is available at Iowa Research Online: https://ir.uiowa.edu/honors_theses/115 
NON-RATIONAL PERSONS AND THE ORIGINAL POSITION: A RAWLSIAN DEFENSE OF ANIMAL 
CITIZENSHIP 
by 
Michael Corazza 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for graduation with Honors in the Philosophy 
________________________________________________ 
Diane Jeske 
Thesis Mentor 
Spring 2018 
All requirements for graduation with Honors in the 
Philosophy have been completed. 
________________________________________________ 
Carrie Figdor 
Philosophy Honors Advisor 
This honors thesis is available at Iowa Research Online: https://ir.uiowa.edu/honors_theses/115 
1 
 
Non-Rational Persons and the Original Position: A Rawlsian 
Defense of Animal Citizenship 
Michael Corazza 
 
   John Rawls’s approach to political philosophy, like other contractarian theories, is non-
sympathetic to those who don’t qualify as moral persons.1 Mark Rowlands challenges this 
position in “Contractarianism and Animal Rights” by arguing that species, as well as strength, 
class, intelligence et al. is a natural asset that ought to be hidden behind the veil of ignorance. 
As such, parties in the original position must extend the principles of justice to non-human 
animals as a matter of personal interest. I argue that criticisms of Rowlands’ claim are based on 
a fundamental misunderstanding of personhood, and so what it means to be a proper recipient of 
justice. The aims of this paper are threefold: first, to discuss various criticisms of Rowlands’ 
essay; second, to establish an alternative definition of personhood; and lastly, to explore the 
implications of what an expanded account of rights might entail.2 
 
The Original Position/Two Principles of Justice: 
   At the heart of Rawls’s theory of justice is a mode of reflection called the original position. 
What makes the original position so important to the project of this paper – and, more broadly, 
the study of political philosophy in general – is its power to facilitate an unbiased, rational 
                                                          
1 Moral personhood in the Rawlsian sense will be discussed at greater length later on 
2 Of course, this account is not meant to reflect Rawls’s interpretation of the original position. In fact, it is clear that 
on a number of occasions he outwardly rejects the claim that animals ought to receive justice via his theory—the 
goal of this paper is to show that Rawls’s theory of justice is incompatible with his preclusion of non-rational 
beings, and that, on the contrary, it entails basic citizenship rights for all individuals, human and non-human. 
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consideration of the foundations of justice. An independent segment is devoted to this concept 
because of its central importance. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that throughout 
his discussion of justice, Rawls is referring primarily to justice as it applies to social institutions. 
That is, what it means for a political organization to justly distribute the various advantages and 
restrictions, positive and negative rights, it grants to its constituents. 
   At the beginning of Theory of Justice, Rawls claims that justice is the highest virtue a social 
institution can possess. He calls this “our intuitive conviction of the primacy of justice” (Theory, 
4). The key to discovering whether this is a well-founded intuition lies in a mode of reflection 
called the original position. The original position is a hypothetical device to help us understand 
what some of the fundamental assumptions of a just society might be. In order to do this we must 
imagine a number of persons who must formulate the governing principles of their society. 
   Rawls describes these persons as being “rational and mutually disinterested.” That is, they are 
concerned solely with the advancement of their own interests, and neither positively nor 
negatively motivated by the interests of others. In this context, those who wish to advance their 
interests are those who are intent on acquiring a larger share of the primary social goods 
(Theory, 123). Primary social goods – described in Theory of Justice as consisting of “rights and 
liberties, powers and opportunities, [and] income and wealth,” as well as self-respect (Theory, 
54, 386)3 – are what every rational person strives for, no matter what their broader conception of 
the good might be. This is because the primary social goods are thought to be implicitly included 
in most conceptions of the good, and so are acknowledged by each member of the original 
position as worth ensuring. 
                                                          
3 In Political Liberalism Rawls offers an expanded list (181) 
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   Crucial to the idea of the original position is what Rawls calls the veil of ignorance. The veil of 
ignorance ensures that each of the parties is unaware of certain facts about themselves and their 
place in society.  Each person is unaware of her social position, her intelligence, her physical 
abilities, and so on. Furthermore, she isn’t aware of her conception of the good, nor the level of 
economic or political advancement her society has reached.4 By remaining ignorant of these 
facts, members of the original position have no motivation to give special consideration to any 
one class or group, because they are unaware of what position they might find themselves in 
once the veil has lifted. 
   Based on these limitations (what I shall hereon refer to as epistemic restrictions) rational 
agents in the original position are expected to arrive at a set of principles that ensures their 
highest share of the primary goods. Inherent in the character of rational personhood is the desire 
to minimize risk and ensure a result preferable to the worst outcome. This precaution is founded 
on a socio-economic theory of decision-making called the maxmin rule: rational persons will in 
uncertain positions choose “the alternative the worst outcome of which is superior to the worst 
outcomes of the others” (Theory, 133). 5 In other words, one rationally makes choices when she 
chooses what is likely to be the best outcome out of all the worst possible outcomes. Such a 
strategy is thought to be preferable among rational persons because it guarantees protection 
against the worst outcome of all possible decisions.  
                                                          
4 This isn’t to say that general political, economic, and psychological facts are hidden from the parties. On the 
contrary, Rawls says explicitly that parties in the original position are at least basically versed in these basic facts 
5 The credibility of the maximin rule has been disputed at length; however, this paper isn’t concerned with the 
overall credibility of Rawls’s contractarianism as much as it is with the theory’s implications for animal rights 
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   With all this in mind, Rawls posits that the members of the original position would reach two 
principles of justice.6 He defines his first principle as follows 
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a 
similar system of liberty for all (Theory,  266) 
   According to this principle, each member of society ought to have certain basic liberties 
regardless of their social position, race, intellectual or physical capabilities, etc. Rawls 
understands a system of liberties as consisting of several basic rights, among which are the 
freedom of expression, freedom to vote, freedom from assault, freedom from psychological 
oppression, and so on (Theory, 53).  
   The second principle has two major components: first, that any social or economic inequalities 
can only exist if they leave the worst-off in society in a better position than they would be 
otherwise; and second, that there is a “fair equality of opportunity”. 
   This first component of the second principle is called the difference principle, and is crucial to 
Rawls’s justification of the inequalities of society. For instance, it would only be acceptable for 
doctors to receive a greater share of wealth than the average person if allowing this difference 
would lead to the worst-off being in a better position than if the inequality didn’t exist. Assuming 
that an increased salary would raise the supply of doctors, and doctors are needed in society, the 
resulting material inequality would be acceptable according to the difference principle. 
   The second component – Rawls’s “fair equality of opportunity” clause – has a number of 
interesting implications for animal citizenship. For now, it shall suffice to say that for Rawls, fair 
                                                          
6 I shall not discuss Rawls’s rejection of the principle of average utility, nor alternative principles besides the two 
discussed above. My intention is to show that a proper theory of justice as Rawls construes it is not only 
compatible with, but entails an equal consideration of non-rational persons 
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equality of opportunity isn’t just in reference to occupational availability, but an allusion to a 
broader claim about the individual pursuit of the good. In regards to this latter claim, Rawls 
argues that the cultivation of one’s talents results in a personal fulfillment that is essential to 
achieving the primary good of self-respect (Theory, 372). 
   Though these two principles are fundamental to any just society, Rawls is careful to note that 
the first principle has “lexical priority” over the second. That is to say, in a situation where one 
principle comes into conflict with the other, the first principle is to be preferred.7 As Rawls 
discusses at the beginning of Theory of Justice, a proper intuition about the primacy of justice 
entails a certain “inviolability” of each individuals’ rights, which the first principle protects. 
(Theory, 3). 8 
A Note on the Metaphysics of Liberalism and Morality: 
   Between Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism there is an apparent evolution of Rawls’s 
conception of the moral person. In Theory, Rawls describes the moral person in a Kantian sense, 
having inviolable rights but varying capacities for rational thought (Theory, 297). This 
assumption of moral nature seems to rest on larger metaphysical assumptions that Rawls isn’t 
inclined to defend. By the time he publishes Political Liberalism, “moral personality” is 
described not from the position of a moral realist, but someone concerned with the political 
implications of his theory. Put another way, Rawls is not concerned with delineating ethical 
truths in the sense that Kant might. His task is to formulate a system of reflection that coincides 
with common intuitions concerning justice in a democratic state: 
                                                          
7 Keep in mind that the second principle includes the difference principle 
8 Though it won’t be discussed here, Rawls also gives lexical priority to fair equality of opportunity over the 
difference principle 
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In justice as fairness the aim is to work out a conception of political and social justice which is congenial to the most 
deep-seated convictions and traditions of the modern democratic state…Thus, from the start the conception of the 
person is regarded as part of a conception of political and social justice...This ideal is not to be mistaken for an ideal 
for personal life…much less as a moral ideal such as the Stoic ideal of a wise man (PL, 300). 
   This is a difficult task, considering any theory that aims at a conception of justice which is 
“congenial to the most deep-seated convictions” of society sounds like a moral one. 
Nevertheless, the goal of this paper isn’t to challenge Rawls’s aim to design a political account 
of justice. Thus, any following considerations of an expansion of the principles of justice shall be 
without reference to any moral claims outside of the ones implicit in Rawls’s theory. 
   As we will see, philosophers like Mark Rowlands wish to use the original position in a broader 
sense. At the beginning of “Contractarianism and Animal Rights,” Rowlands argues that the 
original position can be used as a means to arrive at a “general theory of morality” (Rowlands, 
236). Regardless of whether Rawls’s mode of contractarianism has this function, I will not 
presume that it does. The claim that parties in the original position can arrive at general moral 
principles is beyond the scope of this paper, and unnecessary to achieving its purpose. Rowland’s 
argument can still be applied to Rawls in a way that shows the original position requires equal 
consideration of non-rational persons without being instrument for discovering broader moral 
truths. 
 
The Intuitive Equality Argument: 
   In “Contractarianism and Animal Rights,” Mark Rowlands argues that Rawls implicitly 
endorses some notion of moral entitlement in his construction of the original position. He calls 
this the Intuitive Equality Argument: 
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P1: If any individual S has done nothing to merit possession of a property P, then S is not 
morally entitled to P. 
P2: If S is not morally entitled to P, then S is not morally entitled to whatever benefits accrue 
from the possession of P. 
P3: For any individual F, there is a set S of properties (P1,, P2 …Pn) that S possesses without 
having done anything to merit possession. 
C: Therefore, for any individual S, there is a set Z of properties such that S is not morally entitled 
to the benefits which accrue from possession of Z (Rowlands, 237). 
 
   If someone enters into a position of material wealth as a matter of good fortune, she’s done 
nothing to earn it and so is neither morally entitled to its possession nor to any of its directly 
accumulated benefits.9 Rawls expands this claim to include a range of capacities a member of 
society might have. In addition to social status, no person has a special entitlement to her 
intelligence, athletic ability, charm, etc. Merely winning the genetic lottery is not sufficient for 
being entitled to a larger share of primary goods. So, for any person who enjoys the benefits of 
social or biological advantages outside of her control, she is not entitled to any benefits that 
might accrue as a result. 
   However, this fact does not entail that anyone has the right or duty to deprive other people of 
these advantages. What permits acceptable inequalities in society – whether via social or genetic 
advantage – is that any course of action pursued with these advantages is to the benefit of the 
worst-off. 
 
Application to Animal Rights: 
                                                          
9 Rawls does endorse some notion of inheritance, but I will not discuss it in this paper 
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   Rowlands argues that the intuitive equality principle requires us to allow for the possibility of 
parties in the original position to incarnate as any individual in society—including non-human 
animals. Recall that when we consider the original position, each person behind the veil of 
ignorance has no knowledge of her natural assets, including intellectual and physical abilities. 
Non-human animals may lack the cognitive complexity enjoyed by most adult humans, but are 
nonetheless inextricably tied to the state’s legal system.  
   An expanded application of the principles of justice needn’t rely on human compassion, but 
would be chosen by members of the original position out of necessity. Recall Rawls’s maximin 
rule: no rational agent intent on achieving an acceptable share of primary goods would risk 
incarnating as an animal if the principles of justice only applied to humans. So, members of the 
original position must expand the principles of justice to include non-rational beings in order to 
avoid risk.10 Rawls’s epistemic restrictions require race, gender, intellect, and class all to be 
hidden behind the veil of ignorance—why not species?  
 
Is IEP Compatible with the Original Position? 
   David Svolba argues that Rawls sets an intuitive foundation for his two principles of justice, 
but that the intuitive equality argument (or IEP) does not adequately capture what this foundation 
                                                          
10   Given the inherently political nature of these principles, I will assume that this extension only pertains to 
animals who are integrated into human society. Will Kimlicka suggests in Zoopolis that wild animals ought to be 
treated as members of a distinct sovereign state, and so would would entail several negative duties on the part of 
humans; namely, to refrain from further encroaching on the “uninhabited” parts of the world. On the other hand, 
some might argue that society’s influence on the wild entails the two principles of justice ought to apply to all 
creatures within the boundaries of the state—including animals that aren’t directly integrated into human society. 
It is unclear where Rowlands falls on this issue, but for the purposes of this paper I will only focus on institutional 
justice as it pertains to domesticated animals.    
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is. Svolba offers an alternative account, which he calls the intuitive equality of persons principle, 
or IEPP: 
For any person P, in a political society, S, if P possesses a property, Y, and if P’s possession of Y is undeserved, in 
the sense that P is not responsible for, or has done nothing to merit, Y, then P’s possession of Y cannot justify 
assigning to P a greater or lesser share of primary goods relative to other persons in S (Svolba, 977) 
   Three major distinctions can be drawn between this account and Rowland’s original 
formulation. Foremost is the IEPP’s inclusion of “person.” As we will see, Svolba wishes to 
define personhood in terms of Rawls’s definition of moral personhood. Secondly, in Svolba’s 
account differences in primary goods that result from differences in natural assets are 
undeserved, whereas in Rowland’s account the mere differences in natural assets alone are 
enough to be considered undeserved. Finally, the IEPP specifies that such inequalities must 
pertain to individuals who are “co-members of [the political society]” in order to be considered 
undeserved (Svolba, 977). As in the case of persons, Svolba implicitly claims animals aren’t 
members of society, and so cannot be recipients of the principles of justice.  
   Throughout this paper, I will discuss Svolba’s justifications for these amendments, and why he 
thinks they limit considerations of justice to rational persons.  
   First, I will introduce Svolba’s argument from moral personhood. After finding that this view 
is both incompatible with Rawls’s theory of justice and implausible on its own, I will argue for 
an expanded view of the person. 
 
The Argument from Moral Personhood:  
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   Immediately apparent in the IEPP is Svolba’s addition of “person”. As we will see, this 
amendment is compatible with Rowland’s final conclusion but requires a different reading of 
personhood. In “Political Liberalism” Rawls defines the moral person as being rational and 
reasonable. Svolba glosses over these two terms, but it is important to specify what they mean in 
the Rawlsian sense. Rationality is defined as the ability to have a conception of the good which is 
open to revision and pursuit. However, rationality manifests differently under the constraints of 
the original position. Parties behind the veil of ignorance are unaware of any personal conception 
of the good, but do have an abstract notion of the primary goods, which include liberty, income 
and wealth, equality, and the like. Thus, the fact of rationality in the original position ensures an 
optimal share of primary goods for each individual (Theory, 79). Outside of the original position, 
rationality manifests as a person’s ability to create a plan of life that most efficiently achieves 
what she perceives as her greatest achievable end (PL, 302). The quality of reasonableness 
entails that a person is intrinsically motivated to maintain the stability of her society. Rawls calls 
this a “sense of justice”: “the capacity to understand, to apply, and normally to be moved by an 
effective desire to act from…the principles of justice” (PL, 302).  
   It is these two attributes of the moral person that Rawls argues enables individuals to 
participate in large-scale social cooperation (PL, 301). Svolba argues that the equality inherent in 
the intuitive equality principle arises by virtue of moral personhood, and so is a necessary 
condition for equality between persons. Since the IEPP is essential to Rawls’s two principles of 
justice, any reference to equality in the first or second principle assumes equality among moral 
persons. 
   If this is the case, undeserved inequalities between animals and moral persons are not protected 
by the IEPP or the two principles of justice: 
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…undeserved inequalities are morally objectionable if and only if the subjects of these inequalities are moral equals, 
and that not all individuals are equal from a moral point of view…Rawls held that human beings are moral equals by 
virtue of their status as moral persons… (Svolba, 978) 
   Non-reasonable and non-rational individuals cannot possess the sense of justice necessary to 
maintaining a just society, and so never enter into the fair terms of cooperation that accord each 
citizen her right to just treatment. 
   There are a number of problems with this reading of moral personhood. If society restricted 
considerations of equality only to those who possessed certain intellectual abilities, it would 
exclude other persons commonly regarded as possessing the same rights. Consider a man who 
has a severe intellectual disorder and lives in poverty. Without sharing in the fair equality of 
opportunity, employers could justly deny him work; without the protection of the difference 
principle, economic stratification could drive him into deeper poverty; without equal liberties, he 
could be denied the right to vote, and so on. 
   Given that Rawls’s aim is to isolate our deepest convictions of equality in democratic society, a 
lower threshold for equality is required if it is to include people commonly thought to be proper 
recipients of justice. Though it is true Rawls regards moral personality as sufficient for 
determining equality between persons, he notes that “whether moral personality is also a 
necessary condition I shall leave aside.” He goes on to stress that among individuals who lack 
the requisite capacities for moral personhood, there is no reason for “depriving” them of the “full 
protection of justice” (Theory, 443). This stands in direct contrast to Svolba’s implication that 
society ought to accord justice to individuals solely based on certain capacities. It might be said 
that those who have the capacity to possess a sense of justice must exercise it, but there is no 
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indication that this fact renders the two principles of justice inapplicable to society’s non-rational 
members.   
   Thus far, there are two major flaws in Svolba’s argument. First, it doesn’t reflect Rawls’s 
criterion for assigning equality as he claims it does, and second, by itself such a strict criteria 
would leave out far too many kinds of people. 
The Fairness Problem: 
   Svolba’s second objection relies on Rawls’s notion of the fair terms of cooperation: Each 
person in the well-ordered society is driven to comply with its laws, even when doing so isn’t to 
their direct advantage. Rawls claims that this motivation comes from a sense of justice that is 
inherent in every moral person, and creates a disposition protects against the possibility of people 
benefiting from society and failing to contribute: 
The most fundamental idea in [my] conception of justice is the idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation 
over time…Fair terms of cooperation specify an idea of reciprocity or mutuality: all who do their part as the 
recognized rules require are to benefit as specified by a public and agreed-upon standard (Rawls, 2003, 5-6) 
   Svolba’s worry lies in the presumption that the fair terms of cooperation rest on the sole 
presence of moral persons in society. Animals don’t possess the ability to conceive of mutual 
reciprocity or justice, so they cannot engage in the fair terms of cooperation.  
   Moreover, the fair terms of cooperation dictate rights and duties meant to fairly distribute the 
burdens of society. Since these are concepts only humans can be expected to understand, animals 
lack the ability to contribute in similar ways.  Svolba asks us to consider the example of “free-
riders,” who benefit from opportunities accorded to them on an institutional level, but are 
unwilling to share in the collective burdens of society. Imagine someone who is content living 
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off of his welfare checks indefinitely without looking for work, and after a period of time finds a 
way to avoid paying taxes. 
   Svolba reminds us that such a character couldn’t exist in a well-ordered society, because each 
of its members have a sense of justice that discourages them from failing to contribute. If we 
were to accord rights of citizenship to those who do not share this capacity to reason, such a 
society couldn’t be just, because not all its members would be willing to share in its benefits and 
burdens. 
   There are three major problems with this claim. First is the immediate implication for persons 
who are commonly accepted as deserving recipients of justice. Second is a failure to make a 
distinction between persons who have the intellectual complexity to willingly support society but 
choose not to, and those who do not support society because they lack the ability to conceive of 
what society is. Third is the claim that Rawls thinks moral personality is a necessary condition 
for societal membership. 
   Just as in his discussion of moral personhood, Svolba argues for a conception of justice that has 
serious implications for non-rational persons. If having the capacity to appreciate fair terms of 
cooperation is necessary for being a subject to the benefits of justice, only those who pass a 
certain level of cognitive ability qualify. Consider a society in which, as Svolba suggests, the 
necessary condition for according justice is possessing a certain level of intellectual complexity. 
Since those who pass this threshold are the only ones protected by the principles of justice, an 
entire class of people who would be otherwise considered as deserving of institutional justice 
would be completely ignored: children, the mentally disabled, the mentally ill, and so on.  
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   Svolba also seems to be equating the accordance of institutional benefits to those who can’t 
share in the burdens of society to the accordance of institutional benefits to those who 
consciously refrain from doing so.11 Svolba argues that one who enjoys an “equal share of the 
benefits without accepting an equal share of the burdens” can’t exist in Rawls’s just society 
because of the sense of justice that would predominate its members. It is true that the original 
position places constraints on the individual such that all who are able embrace the fair terms of 
cooperation; however, this is not the case for those who lack the ability to conceive of such 
principles in the first place. 
   After all, we aren’t inclined to brand those incapable of agreeing to fair terms of cooperation as 
“free-riders.” Imagine characterizing a bedridden man with severe Alzheimer’s as someone who 
unjustly receives the benefits of society. Here any lack of desire to share in the burdens of 
society doesn’t stem from a conscious rejection of the fair terms of cooperation; rather, it is due 
to the lack of an ability to conceive of such an abstract concept in the first place.  
   A more plausible reading is not that all members of society must accept the fair terms of 
cooperation, but that all members who are able to abide by them will do so. Construed this way, 
the fair terms of cooperation accommodate the importance of moral personhood without 
excluding non-rational members of society from its benefits and protections. 12 Thus, the just 
                                                          
11 There is something to say for the possibility the certain animals engage in a kind of mutual reciprocity with 
human beings. Consider a farmer who humanely harvests his eggs and allows his chickens to freely explore around 
the property. In this case, both parties seem to be gaining from the arrangement:  the chickens enjoy both 
freedom and protection, and farmer is allowed to harvest some of their eggs. However, one might respond that 
the notion of mutual reciprocity requires a conscious recognition of whatever agreement is being made between 
the two parties. Since this objection raises scientific and epistemological questions about the degree to which an 
animal can understand the arrangements it has with its human cohabitants, I shall assume that—by and large--
they cannot share in the burdens of society.   
12 One might object that such an account allows for psychopaths, who are psychologically incapable of having a 
sense of justice, to be accorded the same basic liberties as everyone else. This raises an interesting question about 
what it means to forfeit one’s rights. If a person is aware of a widely held moral belief or law, should she be 
punished for some crime if she cannot conceive of wrongness in the same sense someone with a ‘normal’ 
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society relies on a faithfulness to the fair terms of cooperation among its rational members, but 
does not confine the principles of justice only to the rational. 
   Svolba’s final goal is to argue that the IEP does not adequately reflect Rawls’s theory. But 
would Rawls endorse Svolba’s alternative?  As previously noted, he isn’t willing to take this 
stance as it pertains to moral personhood being a necessary condition for the accordance of 
justice. Rawls’s hesitance is likely rooted in the controversial implications of limiting justice to 
those who possess certain rational capacities. As in the case of moral personhood, if we only 
accord the rights of membership to those who pass a certain intellectual threshold, an entire class 
of people who are commonly thought to deserve justice would be ignored. 
 
Animals as Persons: 
   In order to avoid the dangerous implications of restricting justice to moral persons, the two 
principles of justice must apply to a wider range of individuals. But if the quality of moral 
personhood isn’t a necessary condition for assigning justice, what is? In this section I argue that 
the common notion of “personhood” ought to take on a new meaning. This change isn’t 
necessitated by any larger moral claim, but can be understood as a re-construal that better 
captures our intuitions concerning the proper recipients of justice. 
   Personhood is commonly thought of as a quality exclusive to human beings, but philosophers 
avoid the claim that this exclusion is based on species membership alone. Theories will isolate 
characteristics unique to human beings, and use them as the sole criterion for determining the 
                                                          
psychology can? This is a question pursuing on its own, but for the purposes of this paper I shall assume that 
psychopaths might be accorded rights, but stand to lose them in light of some offense that merits their abolition. 
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quality of personhood. One such argument, common both among philosophers and in the popular 
sphere, is that personhood relies on some capacity for rational thought. Though definitions of 
rationality vary, here we can understand it as the ability to reflect on, revise, and efficiently 
pursue various ends and desires. 
   Since rationality in this sense is a capacity that is unique to the human race, it is commonly 
thought to be the basis of personhood. After all, human beings possess abilities to think, reason, 
and reflect unlike any other animal on Earth. However, as Will Kymlicka points out in Zoopolis, 
if we were to adopt this view of personhood, it would exclude a significant segment of humanity, 
and may only be applicable for a limited duration over the course of a person’s life: 
If personhood is defined as the capacity to engage in rational argumentation and to conform to consciously 
understood principles, then it is a fluctuating characteristic that varies not only across human beings, but also across 
time within a life (Kymlicka, 27) 
   Young children, the severely intellectually disabled, and those in advanced stages of Dementia 
all lack the requisite capacities to be considered rational, and so by this view would not merit the 
same moral consideration as fully functional adults. To understand personhood in this sense is to 
see it as a continuum; an impermanent status of the individual that never obtains via anything 
other than the attribute of rationality (Kymlicka, 26). 
   For some philosophers, this implication isn’t a problem. According to Raymond Frey, practices 
like animal experimentation are only morally blameworthy insofar as the test subject has the 
capacity for possessing a high quality of life (Frey, 1983).13 In “Moral Standing, the Value of 
                                                          
13 It should be noted that Frey doesn’t understand cognitive complexity as a necessary condition for personhood, 
but as a metric for moral consideration. This is an important distinction, but for the purposes of this essay is 
irrelevant. Since personhood in the context we’re using it is what determines whether members of a society ought 
to be protected by the principles of justice, the implications for denying moral consideration on the part of Frey 
are similar enough to the implications of denying personhood on the part of Rawls and Svolba. 
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Lives, and Speciesism” Frey introduces the “unequal value thesis,” which asserts that human 
lives are generally more worthy of moral consideration than non-human lives. This claim is 
based on the assumption that the value of a life is directly proportional to its quality. Moral 
consideration is only attributable to the extent an individual possesses, or can possess, certain 
characteristics. Since the highest quality lives are those led by individuals with greater cognitive 
complexity, human lives are typically worth the most.  
    Other arguments concerning linguistic ability and long-term planning exist in the literature, 
but I will not discuss them here. What is characteristic of nearly all these theories is their reliance 
on capacities possessed exclusively among human beings. The problem is, each fails to account 
for all humans, and so lead to the same unstable moral landscape described by Frey. A theory 
like this invariably creates a “patchwork quilt” of moral status that constantly shifts according to 
the varied capacities of different individuals (Kymlicka, 26). 
   Another problem with what we might call the “threshold view” (that is, the position that an 
individual must pass some threshold of intellectual or linguistic ability in order to have rights) is 
that it seems to base its standard of moral consideration on human capacities. But on what 
grounds is this standard established? Suppose hostile aliens invade Planet Earth and enslave the 
human race. Their justification is that only those who possess the ability to kinetically levitate 
can be accorded rights. To cite rationality as a quality rendering humans morally superior to 
animals is to overlook the same point: that there are certain facts common across all forms of 
sentient life that are enough to justify basic moral consideration.  
In order to confine considerations of justice to the human race, one must overtly embrace a 
theory that places value on homo sapiens qua homo sapiens. According to philosophers like 
Margaret Somerville: 
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Universal human personhood means that every human being has an ‘intrinsic dignity’ that comes simply with being 
human; having that dignity does not depend on having any other attribute or functional capacity (Kymlicka, 29) 
   Here is where we reach what Kymlicka calls the “nadir of appeals to personhood,” or 
speciesism (Kymlicka, 29). Speciesism is a school in philosophy that asserts species membership 
is enough to determine an individual’s political or moral status. In Somerville’s argument, there 
appears to be an implicit assumption about the ontology of being human: by possessing an 
“intrinsic dignity”, we are more deserving of justice and respect than other creatures. So, 
regardless of any disparities in natural ability, personhood rises solely from the quality of being 
human. But on what grounds can one make this argument? If the differences among individuals 
within a species don’t merit special moral consideration, why would differences among 
individuals of different species merit consideration? 
   Any serious reflection should render this assertion as the logical equivalent to the claim that 
whites are intrinsically superior to Hispanics or African-Americans—ascribing intrinsic 
superiority in this sense isn’t based on anything but the whims and biases of the theorist 
ascribing it. The only significant distinction that can be made between humans and animals is the 
human tendency to have higher-order thoughts and experiences, but to use this as the sole 
criterion for assigning personhood would be to revert back to Frey’s claim. Thus, if one wishes 
to confine personhood solely to all humans, he must argue that humans are worthy of 
personhood by virtue of being human. But basing personhood on something as arbitrary and 
ontologically meaningless as genetic kinship shouldn’t require any refutation beyond the prima 
facie absurdity of the claim itself.  
   Once we’ve determined personhood is not confined to the human race, to whom can we 
reasonably ascribe it? Before answering this question, it will be helpful to distinguish between 
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the second-order relationship between experience and awareness. Experience is the subjective, 
conscious registration of various external and internal stimuli. These stimuli may include 
physical sensations such as sight, touch, smell, and emotions like pleasure, fear, and boredom. 
Awareness in contrast is second-order experience. We are aware when we perceive the 
phenomenon of experience—it is the acknowledgement of an “experiencer” “experiencing.”14 
   Critics of animal rights theory will often reference this distinction--consider how livestock are 
often characterized as ‘mindless’ or ‘unaware of what’s happening to them’ as a way to justify 
their confinement and slaughter. Many feel uncomfortable with the idea of eating intelligent, 
sensitive creatures, and so characterize them as being objects or commodities. Since non-human 
animals aren’t “aware” of their experience, the quality of the experience itself is somehow 
negated. 
   Setting aside the fact that this is merely another iteration of Frey’s unequal value thesis, there is 
another implicit claim here worth exploring: that experience without awareness is insufficient for 
ascribing moral consideration.  
   If this were true, society would have no obligation to accord equal justice to non-human 
animals. But does the unacknowledged experience of an emotion—say, love—negate its 
significance? If a mother loses sight of her child at the farmer’s market, it isn’t after a lengthy 
philosophical investigation that she feels panic and anxiety. In fact, she reverts back to what’s 
hardwired in every sentient creature on earth. 
                                                          
14 For the purposes of this paper I assume that humans are the only animals on earth who possess this latter 
quality. Whether other species have this capacity remains a mystery; however, research in recent years shows it 
might be possible 
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   In the case of maternal love, whether it is the attachment of a human mother to her child, or a 
squirrel to her litter, both experience a release of oxytocin15 at the moment of birth, which 
immediately establishes a strong attachment on the part of the mother. Even if the brains of two 
individuals process information differently, is the essential experience any less valuable?16 
Subjective experience doesn’t need to be consciously acknowledged in order for it to be real—in 
the words of scientist and author Peter Wohlleben, “Instinctive maternal love cannot be second-
rate, because no other kind of maternal love exists” (Wohlleben, 15).  
   To be sure, humans possess a kind of cognitive complexity that allows for a deeper 
understanding of experience that other animals don’t possess; to a limited extent the human brain 
can even suppress and facilitate various emotional states. But are these capacities necessary for 
moral consideration? Most would agree that if a man terrorizes someone with Alzheimer’s, he 
would be just as much at fault as he would be for attacking someone else who could remember 
the assault for a longer period of time. A mother cow may only temporarily be in a state of grief 
when her calf is taken away, but does this fact nullify the wrongness of the separation? Even if 
awareness leads us to ascribe more extensive rights to the individual,17 the absence of awareness 
doesn’t seem to justify otherwise unacceptable treatment. 
   Following Tom Regan, I suggest that sentience is necessary and sufficient for according the 
status of personhood (Wellman, 109). To possess sentience, to feel, to fear, to have motivations, 
entails an inherent value that’s worth respecting as an end in itself. Notwithstanding the ability to 
understand experience, the reality of experience itself should be enough to merit moral 
                                                          
15 The chemical most commonly associated with extreme affection and even love 
16 It is true that many animals possess abilities that affect their experience in ways we cannot imagine (such as the 
hearing of a cat or sight of a hawk), but a difference in experience doesn’t imply a negation of its existence 
17 Such as the right to vote, to own land, to equal opportunity, etc. 
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consideration. Jeremy Bentham famously summarizes this point in An Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation: 
The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be 
abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may come one day to be recognized, the number of legs, 
the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a 
sensitive being to the same fate...The question is not, can they reason? Nor, can they talk? But, can they suffer? 
(Wellman, 116) 
   Bentham doesn’t endorse a theory of natural rights, but neither does Rawls. Remember that 
any reference to moral consideration in this discussion is a mere extension of the most basic 
dispositions members of a liberal society are expected to possess.18  
   One might object that this claim does not specify which individuals have a complex enough 
psychology to possess sentience. If we use the term too broadly, we risk including organisms that 
likely don’t possess a sense of self, like plants and insects. Though the discovery of what 
cognitive threshold must be passed in order to achieve sentience is important, it isn’t necessary 
for the project of this paper. All that needs to be established is that a large number of animals do 
possess sentience, and therefore require many of the same institutional protections that society 
accords to human beings (Kymlicka, 31) 
   Especially relevant to this discussion are the animals directly subject to human exploitation. 
The average life expectancy of a pig is roughly 25 years, but most are no more than a few 
months old when they are sent to the slaughterhouse. Until then, huge numbers are confined to 
spaces too small to turn around, and never see the outdoors. Given the number of pigs at an 
average factory farm, drainage systems are often overwhelmed, and leave hundreds forced to live 
                                                          
18 That is, all those who can possess such dispositions 
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in their own filth. These practices are commonplace among animal feeding operations, which 
dominate an industry that slaughters 115 million pigs a year in the United States alone (PETA).   
   Despite this fact, we know that wild hogs not only exhibit sentience, but have the intelligence 
to outwit many of the hunters who track them. Whenever boar are culled in the wild, others in 
the area will take notice and collect food during times of day they know the trappers won’t be 
searching for them. Like humans, mothers will form bonds with their young that may last a 
lifetime. In a study conducted by the University of Veterinary Medicine in Vienna, researchers 
tracked the behavior of a sow who gave birth to a total of roughly 160 piglets. Over the course of 
her life, the mother pig engaged in activities like teaching her young to build dens, and even 
served as a midwife for younger sows in the community (Wohlleben, 38-41). 
   If Rawls’s goal is to arrive at a theory of justice that coincides with our most deep-seated 
convictions of a fair society, so too must any theory pertaining to those who qualify as recipients 
of justice. Though most are disinclined to see non-human animals as deserving of moral 
consideration, deeper inquiry reveals biases rather than reasons for holding this belief. For any 
theory that ties personhood to capacity, a volatility of moral status arises that leaves us making 
implausible conclusions about the nature of personhood.  
   As has been stated frequently throughout this paper, Rawls is careful to construct a political 
theory rather than a moral one. His goal is to design a system of rules that best captures common 
intuitions about what constitutes a just society. In Political Liberalism he avoids endorsing any 
comprehensive meta-ethical theory, and seeks only to establish a “weak” conception of the good. 
Therefore, any expanded definition of personhood is no more of a moral statement than the IEPP 
is. 
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   If we extend the IEPP to include all persons, the principle has a stronger intuitive viability. Not 
only does it eliminate criticisms posed to Rawls’s theory concerning the severely intellectually 
disabled, it also accounts for the intuition that would arise in any person rationally contemplating 
the shared quality of sentience across human and animal selves: that as long as justice ought to 
be accorded to the most disabled of humanity, so too must it be accorded to animal kind.  
 
The “Tendentious” Nature of Animal Justice: 
   In the sections above I addressed Svolba’s claim that the IEP isn’t compatible with a proper 
interpretation of Rawls’s theory of justice. Here I consider the claim that the IEP is not a tenable 
theory by itself. Svolba has two supporting reasons for this argument, and both are relevant to the 
IEPP argument if it is to be construed as I’ve outlined.19 
   Svolba’s first argument references the nature of revision and agreement concerning the 
governing principles formulated in the original position. In Theory of Justice, Rawls predicts that 
those behind the veil of ignorance will arrive at “widely accepted premises to more specific 
conclusions…” concerning the formulation of the two principles of justice. Since even the most 
general principles are likely to have at least implicit assumptions about which individuals they 
pertain to, members of the original position must have an understanding of who the recipients 
are. 
   When confronted with this dilemma, Svolba claims that members of the original position are 
unlikely to endorse principles of justice that apply to anyone other than human beings: 
                                                          
19 Recall that this re-construal entails that any reference to persons in the IEPP must extend to include all sentient 
life rather than only humans 
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The principle would be roundly rejected by those who—like Rawls—subscribe to the traditional and still pervasive 
moral view that persons, by virtue of their distinctive capacities for rationality and moral agency, are owed special 
moral consideration and respect. Proponents of this view…will reject the idea that a fair and impartial idea of what 
the moral rules should be would omit consideration of properties like rationality and moral agency (Svolba, 981) 
   Since this belief is thought to be universally held by parties in the original position, any 
institutional rules they agree on can only be accorded to rational persons. Thus, given the 
“tendentious nature” regarding Rowlands’ definition of personhood, the IEP (and my revision of 
the IEPP) cannot be an assumption among parties in the original position. 
   The essential problem with this objection is its failure to acknowledge the “thickness” of the 
veil of ignorance. Among the attributes of wealth and class, parties in the original position are 
ignorant of their various conceptions of the good. Included in these conceptions are morality and 
religion; after all, goodness for many is defined within the parameters of spiritual or moralistic 
frameworks. If this is the case, then parties in the original position can’t have any notion of 
moral rules20 in the first place. Though restrictions in the original position are designed in such a 
way that its members possess the quality of rationality, it doesn’t follow that they can be 
expected to confine justice to human beings on moral grounds. 
   Since all religious, moral and philosophical doctrines are unknown to those in the original 
position, any beliefs concerning the moral worth of humans are also hidden. The notion that 
humans are morally unique is a philosophical position that exists along with many others; it does 
not entail a set of beliefs we can presume to be inherent in every person. 
                                                          
20 As Svolba characterizes them above 
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   If, as I suggest, any conception of humanity having a special moral status is hidden behind the 
veil of ignorance, there is no indication that parties of the original position would place the same 
weight on the capacities of moral personhood as what Svolba would expect.21 
 
Animals as Recipients of Justice: 
   Svolba’s final objection to the IEP is that there is no reason why members of the original 
position would consider being incarnated as animals in the first place. Making such an 
assumption would only be possible for someone who is “already predisposed to affirm animal 
rights” (Svolba, 983).  
   This objection has already been partially dealt with in the last section. Members of the original 
position will neither be predisposed to believe that the principles of justice apply exclusively to 
humans, nor all animal life. To think that anyone in the original position starts with either of 
these beliefs is to assume they’ve adopted a moral position. Of course, this is impossible since 
moral positions are hidden behind the veil of ignorance.  
   This leads us to an impasse: how can parties in the original position know who recipients of 
justice are if they lack any conception of personhood? To answer this question, we must recall 
that the purpose of the IEP/IEPP is to capture a fundamental assumption in Rawls’s theory: 
                                                          
21 One might respond that the parties must hold beliefs like the ones Svolba describes in order to ensure a stable 
society. However, as I have already discussed, there is no reason to believe that a stable society must consist solely 
of moral persons; to make such a claim would entail that Rawls’s just society would be without infants, children, 
the mentally ill, the mentally disabled, and anyone else who lacks the ability to possess moral personhood. 
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For any person P, in a political society, S, if P possesses a property, Y, and if P’s possession of Y is undeserved, in 
the sense that P is not responsible for, or has done nothing to merit, Y, then P’s possession of Y cannot justify 
assigning to P a greater or lesser share of primary goods relative to other persons in S (Svolba, 977) 
   If we understand this principle as implicit in Rawls’s theory of justice, then the subjects of the 
principles of justice are also the subjects of the IEPP.  
   In the IEPP, if “person” is to be construed as “human”, then the principles of justice can only 
apply to human beings. However, in our alternative interpretation personhood cannot plausibly 
be confined to humanity—recall that doing so involves either a reliance on speciesism, or the 
kind of volatile moral landscape Frey endorses. To correct misconceptions about the moral status 
of animals, we must understand them as being persons deserving of the same basic advantages as 
humans. So, in order for the IEPP to remain intuitively viable, it must include all sentient animal-
kind; therefore, parties in the original position would expect to be incarnated as any sentient 
creature, and so would prudentially expand the principles of justice to include non-human 
animals. 
 
 
 
The Implications of Animal Citizenship: 
   If my interpretation of the IEPP is correct, the two principles of justice must apply to all 
sentient life. But what implications does this have for traditional liberal society? Recall that the 
first principle of justice dictates that all persons must have access to a comprehensive set of 
liberties compatible with a similar set of liberties for all. Any institution that imprisons or takes 
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advantage of a person against his will violates this principle. If we are to understand non-human 
animals as persons, all of the basic protections we accord to humans must also apply to animals. 
It follows that any form of animal exploitation, whether it be the collection of dairy products or 
the production of meat, must be abolished.22   
   There is a less obvious question pertaining to the ethicality of owning domestic pets. Some 
philosophers have raised the issue that by breeding animals to be reliant on humans for food and 
shelter, humans render them unable to survive in the wild. By imposing this kind of dependence, 
animals lose their ability to be free and self-sufficient. Since to continue this cycle would be to 
perpetuate the wrongdoing, some argue that humans should work towards the eventual end of 
preventing the repopulation of domestic species. 
   However, to preclude the continued existence of a species seems to compound the wrong rather 
than abate it. It seems more plausible that humans have a duty to sustain and care for the animals 
we have rendered unable to take care of themselves. To this end, we must accord animals certain 
basic rights that enable them to lead fulfilling lives.23 Though it is unclear exactly how humans 
might exercise these duties, it is certain that a new understanding of animals as persons would 
entail a significant shift both in our culture and law (Kymlicka, 7). 
                                                          
22 There might be circumstances in which there can be reciprocal arrangements between humans and animals. 
Consider the example of a clutch of chickens who allow their human caretaker to harvest some of their eggs, and 
in turn enjoy the accompanying benefits of shelter and protection; indeed, such an arrangement is entirely 
possible for any household with the (fairly modest) resources needed to keep chickens. The worry here is that this 
kind of reciprocity is difficult to achieve on an industrial level, and so would be extremely difficult to properly 
implement in society. As such, though it is theoretically possible to enjoy the products of certain animals without 
exploiting them, the possibility of abuses being carried out once animal products are commercialized merit enough 
reason to ban animal production on the industrial scale.  
23 Kimlicka borrows from Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, which understands fulfillment as the 
development of certain essential capacities in the individual. However, for the purposes of this paper, no specific 
theory outside of Rawls’s is necessary (Kymlicka, 96) 
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   Consider Gary Francione’s discussion of animal rights in the American legal system. In his 
book Animals, Property and the Law, Francione argues that the law treats animals as the 
equivalent of property. If someone kidnaps and abuses a dog, the attacker is prosecuted, but any 
compensation cannot be earned on the basis of the animal’s suffering. Rather, the law dictates 
that an animal’s owner can only receive financial redress to the extent the animal has decreased 
in its market value (Wellman, 113). 
   Naturally, a revised notion of personhood on the institutional level would entail a radically 
different set of laws in society. Animal owners would no longer be considered “owners,” but 
guardians or protectors of animals who share their living space.24 Animals wouldn’t be subject to 
fights or competitions against their will, nor would they be victims of abuse and neglect without 
receiving the same compensation as someone with the legal status of person. 
   One concern is the degree to which such an approach to Rawls’s theory would implement the 
various rights. Should animals have access to all the places humans do? Should they be ensured 
the same basic standard of material well-being guaranteed to the worst-off in society? Should 
they be allowed to vote? 
   Before addressing these problems, it is important to note that members of a just society can’t 
have identical privileges. Children are accorded the basic rights of life and material well-being, 
but lack the privilege to vote until later in life. Freedom of equal opportunity for a human could 
translate to having a fair shot at applying to the local bakery, while the same principle for a dog 
might simply entail affording it the ability to explore its surroundings. 
                                                          
24 There might be circumstances in which humans play a paternalistic role for their animals—consider a domestic 
cat who wishes to leave the house but is prevented from doing so because of the dangerous traffic outside. In this 
case, there appears to be sufficient reason for denying the animal this particular choice. Of course, the topic of 
limiting rights to less intellectually capable beings is a difficult one, and will not be pursued here. 
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   As the Rawlsian properties of moral personhood develop in the individual, new liberties arise. 
It is only after achieving a certain level of cognitive development that a person is given the right 
to vote. As a person’s rational capacities develop, new abilities emerge. Once these abilities have 
fully matured, new liberties are accorded to those who can exercise them. If the principles of 
justice are expanded to include all non-rational persons, then in the case of humans, certain 
liberties might come and go according to age. Nevertheless, the status of personhood entails 
basic protections for all sentient life, regardless of cognitive complexity. 
   So, we may say that the principles of justice apply insofar as they are relevant to the case of 
the individual.25 In certain climates, dogs might be satisfied sleeping outdoors, while most 
humans need shelter to stay comfortable—if the difference principle requires that any social or 
material inequality must make the worst off in society better off than they would be otherwise, 
the conditions under which a non-human animal would be better-off might follow a less strict 
criterion. 
 
Conclusion: 
   At its heart, an expansion of justice to non-human animals relies on their status as persons. If 
the personhood of all sentient creatures is institutionally acknowledged, there is no morally 
relevant reason to confine liberty only to those who possess rationality. Though the actualization 
                                                          
25 The question raised earlier about the degree to which domesticated animals ought to be allowed access to 
public areas is a difficult one. On one hand it seems that every person has some basic right to mobility, but on the 
other human beings have special obligations to domesticated animals to ensure they aren’t harmed. Naturally, 
some balance between freedom and protection would have to be achieved, and this would vary from location to 
location.   
30 
 
of these liberties may vary across individuals, the basic rights that concern everyone apply to all 
persons. 
    Many assume that humanity has some quality that makes it worth greater moral consideration 
than the rest of animal kind. Once this claim is interrogated, we see that it is reduced either to 
some iteration of the unequal value thesis, or a blatant appeal to speciesism. Assuming that 
neither of these doctrines is morally tenable, the natural conclusion seems to be that rational 
persons are no more deserving of institutional rights than non-rational persons. Thus, a truly just 
society can only be one that extends its liberties to all its members. 
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